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The monthly return distributions of many hedge fund indices exhibit highly unusual 
skewness and kurtosis properties as well as first-order serial correlation. This has 
important consequences for investors. We demonstrate that although hedge fund indices 
are highly attractive in mean-variance terms, this is much less the case when skewness, 
kurtosis and autocorrelation are taken into account. Sharpe Ratios will substantially 
overestimate the true risk-return performance of (portfolios containing) hedge funds. 
Similarly, mean-variance portfolio analysis will over-allocate to hedge funds and 
overestimate the attainable benefits from including hedge funds in an investment 
portfolio. We also find substantial differences between indices that aim to cover the 
same type of strategy. Investors’ perceptions of hedge fund performance and value added 
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Hedge funds are pooled investment vehicles that are privately organised, administered 
by professional investment managers and not widely available to the general investing 
public. Due to their private nature, hedge funds have less restrictions on the use of 
leverage, short-selling and derivatives than more regulated vehicles such as mutual 
funds. This allows them to follow investment strategies that are significantly different 
from the non-leveraged, long-only strategies traditionally followed by investors.  
 
Although they have been around for quite a while, over the past few years especially 
wealthy private investors have shown great interest in hedge funds. As a result, the 
number of funds has increased dramatically. It is estimated that currently there are 
around 6,000 hedge funds with an estimated $400 billion in capital and $1 trillion in 
total assets. Not all these funds are of similar size, however. Around 80% of hedge 
funds are smaller than $100 million and around 50% are smaller than $25 million, 
which reflects the high number of recent new entries.  
 
Many institutional investors are currently in the process of deciding whether or not to 
invest in hedge funds and if so, in which type(s). Most of them will do so by 
comparing the mean-variance characteristics of portfolios with and without hedge 
funds where the hedge fund component will typically be represented by a publicly 
available hedge fund index. In this paper we show that there are two important 
problems with this approach. First, there are significant differences between the 
indices supplied by different data providers. Conclusions will therefore heavily 
depend on the choice of index. Second, the statistical properties of these indices are 
highly unusual. As we will see, monthly index returns are far from normally 
distributed. This means that evaluating portfolios only on their monthly means and 
variances skips over a number of other important properties, which need not be 
advantageous to investors. In addition, monthly returns show significant serial 
correlation, which may lead one to seriously underestimate true volatility and 
correlation.  
In the next two sections we briefly discuss the main types of hedge fund strategies as 
well as the main data providers. In section IV we analyse the returns on 48 different 
hedge fund indices over the period January 1995 – April 2001. We look at these 
indices’ unconditional return distributions, possible serial correlation and ARCH 
effects, as well as their correlations with other asset classes. In section V we discuss 
the implications for performance measurement while in section VI we discuss the 
implications for portfolio analysis. Section VII concludes.  
 
II. Hedge Fund Strategies  
Hedge fund investment strategies tend to be quite different from the strategies 
followed by traditional money managers. Moreover, in principle every fund follows 
its own proprietary strategy. This means that hedge funds are a very heterogeneous 
group. There are, however, a number of ideal types to be distinguished, comprising three 
main groups. So-called Global funds concentrate on economic change around the world 
and sometimes make extensive use of leverage and derivatives. This type of fund is 
responsible for the most media attention and includes well-known names such as George 
Soros's Quantum Fund and Julian Robertson's Tiger Fund Management. Event-Driven Discussion Paper 2001-09 




funds trade the securities of companies in special situations such as a reorganisation or a 
merger. Market Neutral funds are the largest group. These funds simultaneously enter 
into long as well as short positions. Some use fundamental analysis to decide which 
assets to buy and which to short. Others use technical analysis, statistical analysis and/or 
complex theoretical models. Within these three groups it is customary to distinguish a 
number of subgroups. We discuss the most important briefly below.
1 
Global: International - Funds that pick stocks in favoured markets around the world.  
These make less use of derivatives than macro funds (see below). 
Global: Emerging Markets - Funds that focus on emerging and less mature markets. 
These funds tend to be long only because in many emerging markets short selling is 
not permitted and futures and options are not available.  
Global: Macro – Funds that aim to profit from major economic trends and events in 
the global economy, typically large currency and interest rate shifts. These funds 
make extensive use of leverage and derivatives.  
Event Driven: Distressed Securities - Funds that trade the securities of companies in 
reorganization and/or bankruptcy, ranging from senior secured debt to common stock.  
Event Driven: Risk Arbitrage - Funds that trade the securities of companies 
involved in a merger or acquisition, typically buying the stocks of the company being 
acquired while shorting the stocks of its acquirer.  
Market Neutral:  Long/Short Equity – Funds that invest on both the long and the 
short side of the equity market.  Unlike equity market neutral funds (see below), the 
portfolio may not always have zero market risk.  Most funds have a long bias.  
Market Neutral: Convertible arbitrage - Funds that buy undervalued convertible 
securities, while hedging (some of) the intrinsic risks.   
Market Neutral: Equity - Funds that are simultaneously long and short matched 
equity positions, i.e. portfolios are designed to have zero market risk. Leverage is 
often applied to enhance returns.  
Market Neutral: Fixed Income - Funds that exploit pricing anomalies in the global 
market for interest rate securities and their derivatives.  
 
A separate class of funds is formed by so-called Funds of Funds. These are funds that 
invest in other hedge funds. Some limit themselves to one specific type of hedge fund 
but most invest across the board. The idea behind funds of funds is to offer investors a 
“hassle-free” alternative to constructing a basket of hedge funds themselves. In 
addition, many claim to be able to do a better job as they employ experienced 
managers to select funds, carry out due diligence and continuously monitor the 
portfolio. As we will see later, on average funds of funds appear unable to make up 
for the fees charged, which makes them quite an expensive way to manage one’s 
hedge fund investments.  
 
 
III. Hedge Fund Data 
With the industry still in its infancy and hedge funds under no formal obligation to 
disclose their results, gaining insight in the performance characteristics of hedge funds 
is not straightforward. Fortunately, many funds release performance as well as other 
administrative information to attract new and to accommodate existing investors. 
These data are collected by a small number of data vendors and fund advisors, some 
of which make their data available to qualifying investors. Subscribing to these 
databases can be quite expensive. Many investors will therefore initially choose to Discussion Paper 2001-09 




work with the monthly performance indices that are calculated from these databases 
and which are freely available on the internet. Most data vendors and advisors 
calculate one overall or aggregate index as well as a number of sub-indices, 
corresponding to the various types of hedge fund strategies discussed earlier. In what 




Hedge Fund Research (HFR) is a hedge fund research and consulting firm that has 
collected data on around 4,000 different hedge funds. HFR uses a subset of around 
1,500 funds to calculate 33 indices. These indices reflect the monthly net of fee 
returns on equally weighted baskets of funds.  
 
ZURICH CAPITAL MARKETS (www.marhedge.com) 
The Zurich Capital Markets database and the indices calculated from it were 
originally developed and compiled by Managed Accounts Reports (MAR) but were 
sold to Zurich Capital Markets in March 2001. The database contains information on 
around 1,500 hedge funds, which are used to calculate 19 indices. The latter reflect 





The CSFB/Tremont indices are based on the TASS database which tracks around 
2,600 funds. Using a subset of around 650 funds, CSFB/Tremont calculates 10 
indices. Contrary to other indices, the CSFB/Tremont indices reflect the monthly net 
of fee return on an asset-weighted basket of funds. Large funds therefore have a larger 
influence on the index than smaller funds. There are strict rules for fund selection. 
The universe consists only of funds with a minimum of USD 10 million under 
management and a current audited financial statement. Funds are re-selected quarterly 
as necessary.  
 
HENNESSEE (www.hennesseegroup.com) 
The Hennessee Group is a hedge fund advisory firm that maintains a database of 
around 3,000 funds. Based on a subset of about 500 funds, Hennessee calculates 23 




Van Hedge Fund Advisors is a hedge fund advisory firm that has collected data on 
about 3,400 funds. Using a subset of around 500 funds Van calculates 15 indices. 




Altvest is a hedge fund website that aims to provide investors with real-time 
information on alternative investments. The Altvest database contains information on 
around 2000 hedge funds. From the monthly net of fee returns of these funds Altvest 
calculates 14 equally-weighted indices.  
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Hedgefund.net is a hedge fund website that offers investors free hedge fund 
information and performance data. The database covers around 1,800 hedge funds and 
forms the basis for the calculation of 35 indices. The latter reflect the monthly net of 
fee returns on equally-weighted baskets of funds.  
 
An important point concerning hedge funds is the possibility of survivorship bias. 
With around 30% of newly established funds not surviving the first three years, hedge 
fund attrition is relatively high. With lack of performance being one of the drivers, not 
including defunct funds may lead to overestimation of true returns.
3 Fortunately, most 
data vendors do incorporate funds that have ceased to exist in their index calculation 
and thereby avoid the problem of survivorship bias. The only exception is Tuna, 
where, if a fund is shut down, it is completely removed from the indices. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that the information collected by the above parties is 
supplied directly by the fund managers and/or their administrators. Although some 
data providers attempt to perform regular checks, the available data is best thought of 
as un-audited and not independently verified. Another point concerns the lack of 
plausibility of some indices' history. For example, over the 136-month period from 
January 1990 until April 2001 the Zurich Market Neutral Median has produced a 
return of exactly 1.00% in no less than 13 separate months. Obviously, this raises 
serious doubts about the way some of these indices are calculated.  
 
IV. Hedge Fund Index Returns 
We study the monthly returns of 48 hedge fund indices constructed by the above data 
providers spanning the period January 1995 – April 2001.
4 This means that our data set 
includes the Asian, Russian and LTCM crises as well as the end of the IT bubble. The 
indices in our sample are classified into the following categories: Aggregate, Funds of 
Funds, Convertible Arbitrage, Risk Arbitrage, Distressed, Emerging Markets, Macro, 
Long-Short Equity, and Equity Market Neutral. Some summary statistics for the returns 
of each index under these headings are provided in Table 1. For comparison, statistics 
for the S&P 500, the Dow Jones Industrial Average, the Russell 2000 mutual fund index, 
the NASDAQ and the Lehman Brothers Government Bond index returns are presented 
in the last panel of Table 1.  
 
<< Insert Table 1 >> 
 
To those familiar with the typical results from time series analysis of financial asset 
returns, the hedge fund returns presented in Table 1 may seem quite bizarre. Although 
on average indices with a higher standard deviation also offer a higher mean, compared 
to stocks and bonds all except the Macro and Emerging Markets indices combine a 
relatively high mean with a relatively low standard deviation. The indices under the 
Convertible Arbitrage, Risk Arbitrage and Equity Market Neutral headings all have 
standard deviations similar to bonds but means that are substantially higher. The Long-
Short Equity indices have standard deviations that are considerably lower than those of 
the stock market indices but their means are again much higher. This would be clear 
proof of market inefficiency were it not that compared to stocks and bonds many hedge 
fund indices also exhibit relatively low skewness and high kurtosis. Especially Discussion Paper 2001-09 




Convertible Arbitrage, Risk Arbitrage, Distressed Securities and Emerging Markets 
exhibit not only high negative skewness but also large excess kurtosis. This means that 
for these indices, large negative returns are much more likely than would be the case 
under a normal distribution. Given the nature of these strategies, this does not come as a 
complete surprise. As is evidenced by their significant Bera-Jarque (1987) normality test 
statistics, it seems safe to conclude that most hedge fund index returns are not normally 
distributed.  
 
Three other points are worth noting. First, although in essence funds of funds are nothing 
more than baskets of hedge funds, the Fund of Funds indices exhibit significantly lower 
means than the Aggregate indices. This strongly suggests that fund of fund managers are 
unable to add enough value to make up for the fees that they charge. Second, not all 
indices in the same group exhibit similar behaviour. The CSFB/Tremont Aggregate 
index, the Altvest Emerging Markets index, the Zurich Macro index and the Zurich and 
Van Equity Market Neutral indices all seem to differ significantly from the other indices 
in their respective groups. Third, we also see some differences between indices that 
follow different calculation principles. The CSFB/Tremont indices for example are 
value-weighted instead of equally-weighted. Since there can be significant differences in 
size between the funds included in these indices this may lead to an asymmetric 
weighting which may raise the variability of returns.  The standard deviation estimates in 
Table 1 show that this is indeed the case. The Tuna indices produce relatively high mean 
returns. This reflects the fact that these indices contain a significant survivorship bias.   
 
<< Insert Figure 1 >>   
 
The bizarre shape of the unconditional distributions of some of the hedge fund index 
return series is also demonstrated in Figure 1, which plots the distribution of the HFR 
Risk Arbitrage index (continuous line) against the distribution of a normal random 
variable with the same mean and standard deviation (dotted line). Although this is an 
extreme example, the asymmetry about the mean and in particular the very long lower 
tail and complete absence of an upper tail are clearly evident.  
 
<< Insert Table 2 >> 
 
Table 2 examines the correlations between the hedge fund index returns and those of the 
stock and bond market indices. The majority of indices exhibit a low and typically 
negative correlation with the bond market. The only exceptions are Macro and Equity 
Market Neutral, which may reflect the relatively high degree of leverage applied in these 
sectors. Apart from Convertible Arbitrage and Equity Market Neutral, the majority of 
indices show surprisingly high correlations with the equity indices, especially with the 
Russell 2000.  This makes it clear that during the sample period many hedge funds were 
heavily invested in the securities of smaller companies. The Long/Short Equity indices 
are not only highly correlated with the Russell 2000 but also with the NASDAQ, 
implying that these funds must have been heavily invested in small technology stocks. 
Since long/short funds make up more than 30% of the hedge fund market, in terms of 
number of funds as well as assets under management, the same pattern is reflected in the 
Aggregate and Fund of Funds indices.  
 
Hedge funds often sell themselves on the claim that their returns are ‘market-proof’, i.e. 
uncorrelated with general market movements. This may well be true for individual Discussion Paper 2001-09 




funds, which carry relatively high unsystematic risk, but, as we can see from Table 2, it 
is not so for most hedge fund indices. The observed high correlation with the equity 
indices tells us that despite the unorthodox strategies followed by many hedge funds, 
part of their systematic risk is still old-fashioned equity market risk. Since most investors 
nowadays do not invest in a single fund but hold a basket of funds, either self-selected or 
through a fund of funds structure, this is an important point. The Convertible Arbitrage 
and Equity Market Neutral indices are the exception. The nature of these strategies is 
such that these funds pick up less equity market risk. This does not mean there are no 
systematic factors present in their returns however. We simply do not have a clear 
picture of what the systematic factors for these strategies are.  
 
Again, it is interesting to note that different indices within the same group may paint a 
very different picture. Within the Equity Market Neutral class, correlation with the S&P 
500 for example varies from –0.02 to 0.54. Likewise, the Macro indices’ correlation with 
the S&P 500 varies from as low as 0.25 to as high as 0.60. Although all data providers 
aim to provide similar information, a priori it is unlikely that their indices will show 
exactly the same behaviour. Not only may different data providers classify the same 
fund differently but the main databases also show surprisingly little overlap. Liang 
(2000) for example found only 465 common funds when he compared the HFR and 
the TASS databases. This suggests that many funds report to only one data vendor, 
which in turn means that different databases provide information on different subsets 
of the hedge fund universe.  
 
<< Insert Table 3 >> 
 
Table 3 presents an analysis of the relationship between the indices within each category 
by examining their unconditional correlations. The correlations for Aggregate, Funds of 
Funds, Risk Arbitrage, Distressed Securities, Emerging Markets, and Long/Short Equity 
are high – typically between 0.7 and 0.9. This suggests that the various indices within the 
groups have similar constituents, or at least constituents with similar time series of 
returns. On the contrary, the correlations for Convertible Arbitrage, Macro and 
especially for Equity Market Neutral are much lower. Since these are also the indices 
that show relatively low correlation with equity, this suggests that the systematic factors 
that drive these funds returns may quite complex. Again, we see a number of outliers, 
some of which were encountered before in Tables 1 and 2. The CSFB/Tremont 
Aggregate index for example has a relatively low correlation with the other indices in its 
class. A similar observation can be made concerning the CSFB/Tremont Convertible 
Arbitrage, the Tuna Risk Arbitrage, the Van Distressed Securities, the Altvest Emerging 
Markets, the Zurich and Tuna Macro and the Van Equity Market Neutral indices. This 
once again stresses that investors’ perceptions of hedge fund performance will strongly 
depend on the indices used. 
 
<< Insert Table 4 >> 
 
We also studied the unconditional correlation between indices in different groups. With 
48 indices, the results are too extensive to display fully, however. Table 4 therefore 
presents the correlation estimates between the different investment categories of HFR 
indices. We selected the HFR indices for illustration since it is the only vendor supplying 
an index for all of the fund categories under consideration. Although the results 
presented above suggest considerable heterogeneity between the various types of funds, Discussion Paper 2001-09 




the indices in Table 4 show a surprisingly high degree of association. Correlations are 
almost all greater than 0.5, which suggests that the returns on different types of strategies 
may still share the same systematic factors.  With long/short funds making up a large 
part of the hedge fund industry, it is not surprising that the Long/Short Equity, Funds of 
Funds and Aggregate indices turn out to be so highly correlated. More bizarre, however, 
are the high correlations between types of funds that follow strategies which at first sight 
have very little in common, such as Convertible Arbitrage and Distressed Securities for 
example (0.76). The big exception in Table 4 is Equity Market Neutral, where 
correlations with other groups are typically of the order of 0.2. This again shows that 
Equity Market Neutral funds are distinctly different from other types of hedge funds.   
 
<< Insert Table 5 >> 
 
Table 5 shows the basic time series properties of each of the indices, together with those 
of standard market indices for comparison.  We present the autocorrelation coefficients 
for lags 1 to 5 together with the result from the Ljung-Box (1978) test of the joint null 
hypothesis that all of the first 10 autocorrelation coefficients are zero. Under the 
assumption that returns are normally distributed,
5 confidence intervals for the 
correlations can be constructed. For a sample of this size, a correlation coefficient is 
defined as statistically significant at the 10% level if it lies outside –0.19, significant at 
the 5% level if it lies outside –0.22, and significant at the 1% level if it lies outside 
–0.30.  
 
For the stock and bond market indices there is very little evidence of statistically 
significant autocorrelation. Only the lag 5 coefficient for the Russell 2000 and the lag 1 
coefficient for the bond index are significant, while none of the joint statistics lead to 
rejection of the no serial correlation null. These properties are common for monthly time 
series of financial returns, which are widely believed to be linearly independent of their 
previous values. A further point worth noting is that not only are the autocorrelation 
coefficients small in absolute value, they are also mainly negative (except for those of 
the bond index). By contrast, many of the hedge fund indices exhibit highly significant 
positive autocorrelation. All of the Convertible Arbitrage indices have a first order serial 
correlation of at least 0.4, which are also statistically significant at the 1% level. A 
similar feature is observed for Distressed Securities and some of the Risk Arbitrage, 
Emerging Markets and Equity Market Neutral series. It is also reflected in the Funds of 
Funds results but, surprisingly, not in the Aggregate indices.  
 
The observed positive autocorrelation is quite a unique property and seems inconsistent 
with the notion of efficient markets. One possible explanation is that the nature of hedge 
funds’ strategies leads their returns to be inherently related to those of preceding 
months. As this implies lags in the major systematic risk factors, however, this is not 
the most plausible explanation. An alternative explanation lies in the difficulty for 
hedge fund managers to obtain up-to-date valuations of their positions in illiquid and 
complex over-the-counter securities. When confronted with this problem, hedge funds 
either use the last reported transaction price or an estimate of the current market price, 
which may easily create lags in the evolution of their net asset value. This would 
explain why the Convertible Arbitrage and Distressed Securities indices exhibit the 
most significant autocorrelation.
6  
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Finally, the last column of Table 4 presents the test statistics corresponding to Engle’s 
test for ARCH-effects of order up to 4 on the residuals of an AR(5) model to remove 
linear dependencies that could spuriously trip the test. For the majority of series, there is 
little evidence for volatility clustering, except for some indices in the categories 
Convertible Arbitrage, Long/Short Equity and Equity Market Neutral. It should be 
noted, however, that after the linear filter, the remaining 71 observations probably 
represent an insufficiently large sample for the test to hold much power. This also 
explains why we do not find any significant ARCH effects in the stock market indices. 
 
V. Implications for Performance Evaluation 
To evaluate fund performance many practitioners use the Sharpe Ratio, which is 
calculated as the ratio of the average excess return and the return standard deviation of 
the fund being evaluated.
7 As such, it is thought to measure the excess return per unit 
of risk. As shown in the third column of Table 6, for most of the hedge fund indices the 
relatively high means and low standard deviations lead to Sharpe Ratios that are 
considerably higher than those of the stock and bond market indices.
8  Only the 
Emerging Markets indices and the Hennessee Macro index do not beat the market in 
these risk-adjusted terms.  
 
<< Insert Table 6 >>  
 
Whilst this type of analysis is widely used, it only considers the first two moments of the 
return distribution. When fund returns are not normally distributed, however, the mean 
and standard deviation are not sufficient to describe the distribution. As shown in Scott 
and Horvath (1980), under fairly weak assumptions concerning investors’ utility 
functions it can be shown that investors desire high odd moments and low even 
moments. Hedge funds offer relatively high means and low variances, but they also tend 
to give investors third and fourth moment attributes that are exactly opposite of those 
that investors desire. This means that the Sharpe Ratio will systematically overstate true 
hedge fund performance relative to that of the standard market indices. From Tables 1 
and 6 we see a strong relationship between an index’s Sharpe Ratio and the skewness 
and kurtosis of its return distribution. High Sharpe Ratios tend to go together with 
negative skewness and high kurtosis. This means that the relatively high mean and low 
standard deviation offered by hedge fund indices is no free lunch. Investors simply pay 
for a more attractive Sharpe Ratio in the form of more negative skewness and higher 
kurtosis. A recent study by Amin and Kat (2001a) shows that when the whole return 
distribution is taken into account, there is little or no evidence of superior performance in 
hedge fund index returns.  
 
A second point concerns the observed autocorrelation, which will systematically lead 
estimates of the standard deviation to be biased downwards. One possible method for 
evaluating the effect of this bias on the standard deviation stems from the real estate 
finance literature. Due to smoothing in appraisals and infrequent valuations of 
properties, the returns of direct property investment indices suffer from similar 
problems as hedge fund index returns. The approach employed in this literature has 
been to “unsmooth” the observed returns to create a new set of returns which are more 
volatile and whose characteristics are believed to more accurately capture the 
characteristics of the underlying property values. Geltner (1991, 1993) gives an 
extensive discussion of the motivations for and methodologies to unsmooth returns Discussion Paper 2001-09 




series. Following this tradition, the observed (or smoothed) value Vt* of a hedge fund 
index at time t could be expressed as a weighted average of the underlying (true) 
value at time t, Vt, and the smoothed value at time t-1, Vt-1*: 
 
  * ) 1 ( * 1 - - + = t t t V V V a a        (1) 
 
Implicit in equation (1) is that fund managers are using a single exponential 
smoothing approach. Given (1), it is possible to derive an expression that will yield an 










* * 1 t t
t
r r
r         (2) 
 
where rt and rt* are the true underlying (unobservable) return and the observed return 
at time t respectively. Since the stock market indices have autocorrelation coefficients 
that are very close to zero, it seems plausible in the context of the results presented 
above to set a equal to the autocorrelation coefficient at lag 1. The newly constructed 
series, rt, will have the same mean as rt*, and zero first order autocorrelation (aside 
from rounding errors). The resulting standard deviations are presented in the fourth 
column of Table 6, together with a revised Sharpe Ratio constructed using the 
standard deviation of the unsmoothed returns.  
 
The standard deviation of the unsmoothed series will increase when the first order 
autocorrelation coefficient is positive, while a negative coefficient will lead to a lower 
standard deviation. Since in most cases the autocorrelation coefficients are large and 
positive, this results in markedly higher standard deviations for virtually all hedge fund 
indices. For example, the standard deviation for the CSFB/Tremont Convertible 
Arbitrage index increases from 1.36% to 2.42%. The standard deviations of the stock 
and bond market indices on the other hand are largely unchanged or even lower. Since 
hedge fund indices’ standard deviations rise, their Sharpe Ratios fall. For instance, the 
CSFB/Tremont Convertible Arbitrage index’s Sharpe Ratio drops from 1.81 to 1.01.  
 
Since one can never be sure what would be the properties of a series if good quality data 
were available, the notion of unsmoothing may seem far from rigorous. It serves 
nonetheless to illustrate the possible impact of infrequent trading on hedge fund and 
hedge fund index returns. In many cases, Sharpe Ratios that considerably bettered the 
equity indices now do not. An alternative approach that can be used to reduce the degree 
of autocorrelation is to calculate returns over a time span of three months rather than 
one.
9 The penultimate column of Table 6 gives the square root of one third of the 
variance estimated from 3-month data. In the absence of autocorrelation, these standard 
deviations should be identical to those given in the second column of Table 6. In almost 
all cases, however, the standard deviations have increased (although less than with the 
unsmoothed returns), leading to lower Sharpe Ratios (last column). These findings again 
underpin the notion that observed hedge fund index performance systematically 
overstates true performance when measured by the Sharpe Ratio.  
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VI. Implications for Portfolio Analysis 
Accustomed to investment alternatives with more or less normally distributed returns, 
most practitioners evaluate investment portfolios in the mean-variance framework of 
Markowitz (1959). The latter formalizes the idea that out of all possible portfolios a 
risk-averse investor will only be interested in those portfolios that offer the highest 
expected return for a given level of standard deviation. Obviously, this approach 
suffers from the same problem as the Sharpe Ratio. Since it concentrates on the mean 
and standard deviation, it skips over a number of other properties that need not be 
trivial or advantageous for investors. This is especially relevant in our case since, for 
the hedge fund indices studied, more attractive mean-variance attributes appear to go 
hand in hand with less attractive skewness and kurtosis properties. 
 
To investigate the extend of this problem, we performed a standard mean-variance 
optimisation using the S&P 500, the Lehman Brothers bond index and the individual 
hedge funds indices.
10 To create a realistic environment, short selling was not 
allowed. Despite the fact that most investors will typically want to severely restrict 
their hedge fund allocation, we did not include such a restriction for the simple reason 
that to make a significant difference at the portfolio level, one will need to allocate 
substantially more to hedge funds than the 5% typically allocated by institutional 
investors. Of course, any restricted solution will tend towards the unrestricted 
solution. Our results should therefore be interpreted as a limit case.  
 
<< Insert Table 7 >> 
 
We first performed the optimisation without hedge funds, i.e. with equities and bonds 
only, using parameter estimates from the original 1-month return data. Assuming our 
hypothetical investor uses a target standard deviation of 8% per annum,
11 the highest 
achievable expected return in that case is 1.07% per month. Next, we introduced 
hedge funds and performed the same analysis. The second and third column of Table 
7 show the annualised improvement in expected return and the percentage of total 
wealth allocated to hedge funds. With the exception of Emerging Markets, Table 7 
implies a very high allocation to hedge funds and a marked improvement in expected 
return. However, there are significant differences between categories with especially 
Risk Arbitrage, Long/Short Equity and Equity Market Neutral offering a substantial 
pick-up in expected return. Allocations vary quite significantly between categories. 
The average allocation for the Aggregate indices is 75%, while it is only 55% for 
Convertible Arbitrage for example. There is also quite a degree of variation within 
some of the categories. Within the Aggregate category, the improvement in 
annualised return varies from 1.08% to 6.12%, with the hedge fund allocation varying 
between 50% and 100%. Return pick-ups and/or allocations in Convertible Arbitrage, 
Risk Arbitrage, and Equity Market Neutral on the other hand are remarkably similar.  
 
Although this information is not explicitly provided in the table, it is interesting to 
note that different hedge fund indices generate the observed increase in expected 
return in a different way. The Aggregate and Macro indices’ allocations come at the 
cost of the allocations to stocks as well as bonds. The Long/Short Equity indices on 
the other hand primarily replace equity, while the indices in the other categories 
primarily replace bonds. This reflects these indices’ mean-variance characteristics. 
Long/Short Equity has more in common with equity, while Convertible Arbitrage, Discussion Paper 2001-09 




Risk Arbitrage, Distressed Securities and Equity Market Neutral are much more 
similar to bonds.  
 
To check our previous claim that with a severe restriction on the allowable hedge fund 
allocation the attainable improvement in expected return can only be limited, we 
repeated the above procedure restricting the hedge fund allocation to 5%. In virtually 
all cases, the optimiser allocated the full 5% to hedge funds. Given the fact that when 
not restricted, the allocation is many times higher than that, this is not surprising. Due 
to the restriction, however, the average improvement in expected return was limited to 
a meagre 0.30% per annum. Hence these results are not shown.    
 
<< Insert Table 8 >> 
 
Next, we calculated the skewness and kurtosis of the above mean-variance optimal 
portfolios and compared these with the case without hedge funds. The differences can 
be found in the second and third column of Table 8. In most cases where the skewness 
of the hedge fund index is lower (higher) than that of the portfolio to which it is added 
(-0.66), the skewness of the new portfolio tends to be less (more) attractive than that 
of the original portfolio comprising only stocks and bonds. The Equity Market 
Neutral indices are an exception though. Although the latter do not exhibit much 
skewness themselves, adding them still causes portfolio skewness to deteriorate. This 
strongly suggests that the correlation between the Equity Market Neutral indices and 
the S&P 500 is higher in down markets than in up markets. In line with the fact that 
almost all hedge fund indices exhibit positive excess kurtosis while stocks and bonds 
do not, in virtually all cases kurtosis rises significantly after the introduction of hedge 
funds. The above makes it clear that when hedge funds are involved, mean-variance 
analysis is no longer sufficient as a portfolio decision-making tool.   
 
For the individual indices we found a strong relationship between their Sharpe Ratio 
and their skewness and kurtosis properties. Taking a closer look at the observed trade-
off between the improvement in the mean and a portfolio’s skewness and kurtosis 
properties, it becomes clear that we cannot simply conclude that the more the 
expected return improves, the more skewness and kurtosis deteriorate. Some indices, 
such as Long/Short Equity and Equity Market Neutral for example, yield a substantial 
pick-up in expected return but do not seem to add very much skewness or kurtosis. 
The indices in the Convertible and Risk Arbitrage categories, on the other hand, 
appear to come with a lot of additional negative skewness and excess kurtosis.  
 
<< Insert Table 9  >> 
 
The crucial parameters for the determination of the optimal portfolio are the relevant 
assets’ means, variances and correlations. In the previous section we discussed the 
effect of excess smoothness on hedge fund index return variance. However, 
autocorrelation in the hedge fund index returns may also lead one to misestimate true 
correlations. Table 9 shows the correlations between the hedge fund indices and the 
S&P 500 and the Lehman Brothers Government Bond index. The second and fifth 
columns are identical to the second and sixth columns of Table 2 and show the 
correlations calculated from the available 1-month return data. The third and sixth 
columns show the correlations from unsmoothed 1-month data and the fourth and 
seventh column show the correlations from 3-month data.  For most series the Discussion Paper 2001-09 




unsmoothed and 3-month correlations with the S&P 500 are higher than those of the 
original series. The differences are especially large for Convertible Arbitrage and 
Distressed Securities, which are also the categories that show the highest serial 
correlation. The unsmoothed correlations with the bond index tend to be higher than 
for the original data. The 3-month correlations on the other hand tend to be 
significantly lower.  
 
We repeated the portfolio optimisation procedure using the parameter values 
estimated from the unsmoothed 1-month returns and the 3-month returns. The results 
can be found in Table 7. From the table we see that overall the improvement in 
expected return is significantly lower than with the original 1-month data. The 
allocations to hedge funds are still very substantial but, due to the higher standard 
deviations (Table 6) and higher correlations with the S&P 500 (Table 9), mostly lower 
than those found previously. The most noteworthy exceptions are found in 
Convertible Arbitrage, Risk Arbitrage and Equity Market Neutral where the hedge 
fund allocations are remarkably stable. This results from the fact that these indices 
exhibit very low standard deviations (Table 6). The changes in portfolio skewness and 
kurtosis due to the addition of hedge funds can be found in Table 8. These entries are 
similar to the ones found earlier for the original 1-month data. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
In this paper we have examined the statistical properties of a number of freely 
available monthly hedge fund index return series. Our main conclusions are as 
follows: 
1. Unconditional distribution. Many hedge fund index return distributions are 
not normal and exhibit negative skewness and positive excess kurtosis. This is 
especially true for the Convertible Arbitrage, Risk Arbitrage and Distressed 
Securities indices. Indices in the categories Macro and Equity Market Neutral 
are the most noteworthy exceptions. 
2. Time series behaviour. The monthly returns of many hedge fund indices 
exhibit highly significant positive first-order autocorrelation. The phenomenon 
is most apparent in the Convertible Arbitrage, Distressed Securities and 
Emerging Markets indices, which confirms that this is primarily a reflection of 
delays in the marking-to-market of illiquid and OTC securities.   
3. Correlation with other asset classes. With the exception of the Convertible 
Arbitrage and Equity Market Neutral indices, monthly hedge fund index 
returns exhibit a high positive correlation with the stock market. Correlation 
with the bond market is low, however, except for the Macro and Equity 
Market Neutral indices.  
4. Correlation between different categories. With the exception of Equity 
Market Neutral, the monthly returns of the various categories of indices appear 
to be highly correlated, suggesting that different types of strategies partly 
share the same systematic factors. This is not only true for strategies that are 
somewhat alike but also for strategies that a priori have little in common.    
5. Differences between indices of the same type. There is considerable 
heterogeneity between indices that aim to reflect the same type of strategy. 
This is especially true for the Macro and Equity Market Neutral indices. As a 
result, investors’ perceptions of hedge fund performance and value added will 
heavily depend on the indices studied. Discussion Paper 2001-09 




The above findings have a number of implications for those investing or considering 
whether to invest in hedge funds. The most important are: 
6. Overestimation of the Sharpe Ratio. The excess smoothness of the available 
monthly return data will lead one to underestimate true return volatility and 
thereby significantly overestimate the Sharpe Ratio.   
7. Unsuitability of the Sharpe Ratio for performance evaluation. Since it 
only looks at the mean and standard deviation, the Sharpe Ratio is not suitable 
for the evaluation of the performance of (portfolios containing) hedge funds. 
With many hedge fund indices offering skewness and kurtosis properties that are 
exactly opposite of those that investors desire, the Sharpe Ratio will overstate 
true performance.    
8. Overestimation of the benefits of hedge funds. Due to the excess 
smoothness of the available monthly return data, straightforward application 
of mean-variance analysis on monthly hedge fund index return data will over-
allocate to hedge funds and thereby overestimate the attainable improvement 
in expected return at a given level of standard deviation 
9. Unsuitability of mean-variance portfolio analysis. Including hedge funds 
may significantly improve the mean-variance characteristics of a portfolio. 
Since this may be accompanied by deteriorating skewness and kurtosis, 
however, standard mean-variance analysis is too restrictive for portfolio 
decision-making when hedge funds are involved.    
 
Given the unique properties of hedge fund returns, there are several other areas that 
invite further study. For example, several researchers have reported significant 
differences in the correlation between hedge funds and equities in up and down 
markets. A recent paper by Boyer, Gibson and Loretan (1999), however, suggests that 
at least part of this may be due to the conditioning process itself. Likewise, more 
research is required into the implications of the observed skewness and kurtosis for 
standard value at risk and risk budgeting techniques. This will be the subject our next 
paper. Discussion Paper 2001-09 






1. Note that this is just one of several classifications in use. Different data vendors use different 
classifications, some more elaborate than others.  
 
2. We attempted to verify the information below with the individual data vendors themselves. 
However, only HFR, Hennessee and Zurich Capital Markets responded to our request.  
 
3.  Survivorship bias estimates in the literature range from 1.5% to 3% per annum. See for 
example Fung and Hsieh (2000) or Amin and Kat (2001b). 
 
4. All Zurich indices are Reproduced from www.marhedge.com. © Zurich Capital Markets 2001. 
No claim to orig. US Govt works. All rights reserved.  
 
5. An extremely dubious assumption given the analysis presented above, but one which shall be 
used nonetheless to give a general idea of the significance or otherwise of the autocorrelation 
coefficients. 
 
6. A third, more cynical, explanation can be found in Weisman (2000) and Asness, Krail and 
Liew (2001). The latter argue that hedge fund managers may deliberately ‘manage’ their 
marking-to-market to maintain a stream of positive returns with a low variance and a low 
correlation with other asset classes. This view, however, is incompatible with the fact that 
marking-to-market is the responsibility of the fund administrator, not the manager.   
 
7. The Sharpe Ratio was first introduced in Sharpe (1966). Details on its general characteristics 
can be found in Sharpe (1994).   
 
8. All Sharpe Ratios are calculated by subtracting the average US Treasury bill yield over the 
sample period (5.25%) from the annualised average fund return and dividing by the annualised 
fund return standard deviation. 
 
9. The mean returns may be marginally affected by moving to a 3-month differencing interval as 
the 1-month returns are estimated using a sample of 76 observations, a number that is not 
divisible by three. Therefore, the 3-month measures are calculated discarding the last 
observation.  
.  
10. Including foreign stocks and bonds in the portfolio might have set a higher benchmark for 
hedge funds, i.e. have made it more difficult for hedge funds to add value. We did not do so, 
however, as our main goal is not to demonstrate the benefits of hedge funds but purely to 
clarify the effect of their unusual statistical properties on standard portfolio decision-making. 
 
11. A target standard deviation of around 8%, which holds the middle ground between bonds and 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics Hedge Fund Index Return Distributions 
 
  Mean  Standard
Deviation 





AGGREGATE               
HENNESSEE  1.13***  2.34  -0.84***  5.37*** 100.4***  -9.49  7.48 
CSFB/TREMONT  1.22***  2.86  -0.09  0.79  2.08  -7.55  8.53 
ALTVEST  1.51***  2.24  -0.25  2.01*** 13.54***  -6.62  7.85 
VAN  1.35***  2.53  0.01  2.20*** 15.39***  -7.60  8.90 
HFR  1.22***  2.44  -0.72**  2.78*** 31.14***  -8.70  7.65 
TUNA  1.58**  2.19  -0.08  1.54***  7.58**  -5.66  7.91 
FUNDS OF FUNDS               
ZURICH  1.00***  1.64  -0.69**  5.67*** 107.8***  -6.42  6.15 
TUNA  1.12***  1.82  -0.01  2.69*** 22.92***  -5.37  6.61 
ALTVEST  1.76***  2.99  0.40  1.61*** 10.24***  -5.92  11.54 
VAN  1.24***  2.40  0.19  1.83*** 11.09***  -5.20  8.40 
HFR  0.86**  2.07  -0.45  3.18**  34.69***  -7.47  6.85 
CONVERTIBLE ARBITRAGE               
HENNESSEE  0.97***  1.07  -0.78***  2.28*** 24.15***  -2.72  3.56 
HFR  1.14***  0.92  -1.50***  5.88*** 137.7***  -3.19  3.33 
CSFB/TREMONT  1.14***  1.36  -2.41***  8.73*** 41.70***  -4.68  3.57 
TUNA  1.24***  0.96  -1.09***  2.97*** 43.10***  -1.83  3.76 
RISK ARBITRAGE               
ZURICH  1.10***  1.07  -3.21*** 19.77*** 1366***  -5.61  2.84 
HENNESSEE  1.08***  0.98  -3.02*** 18.46*** 1195***  -4.79  3.17 
TUNA  1.24***  1.03  -2.25*** 11.28***  467***  -4.41  3.28 
ALTVEST  1.30***  1.12  -2.74*** 14.67***  777***  -5.28  2.95 
HFR  1.13***  1.06  -3.78*** 22.53*** 1788***  -5.69  2.47 
DISTRESSED               
ZURICH  1.04***  1.77  -2.59*** 14.05***  710***  -9.22  3.90 
HENNESSEE  0.92***  1.88  -2.12***  9.53***  345***  -8.88  4.91 
TUNA  1.03**  2.46  -2.02*** 12.26***  528***  -12.64  7.95 
ALTVEST  1.13***  1.82  -1.23***  4.66*** 88.15***  -7.07  5.25 
VAN  1.07***  1.53  -0.09  3.52*** 39.31***  -4.70  5.70 
HFR  0.91***  1.75  -2.18*** 10.57***  414***  -8.50  5.06 
EMERGING MARKETS               
ZURICH  0.45  4.75  -2.41*** 12.92***  602***  -26.25  12.13 
HENNESSEE  0.35  4.59  -0.91***  4.70*** 80.31***  -20.10  12.51 
HFR  0.60  5.04  -0.81***  3.86*** 55.42***  -21.20  14.80 
CSFB/TREMONT  0.40  5.64  -0.84***  3.09*** 39.09***  -23.03  15.34 
ALTVEST  1.25***  2.21  -0.70**  1.87*** 17.25***  -7.20  5.92 
VAN  0.64  6.05  -0.06  1.96*** 12.17***  -19.90  20.00 
MACRO               
ZURICH  0.85***  1.61  1.23***  3.01*** 47.85***  -2.31  6.90 
HENNESSEE  0.87***  2.55  0.04  1.07*  3.62  -7.52  6.72 
HFR  1.10***  2.34  0.21  -0.18  0.65  -3.77  6.82 
CSFB/TREMONT  1.43***  4.18  -0.11  0.78  2.10  -11.55  10.60 
TUNA  1.30***  2.82  0.19  1.36**  6.27**  -7.58  9.73 
ALTVEST  1.42***  2.72  0.28  -0.53  1.86  -4.15  7.42 
VAN  0.78*  3.48  0.23  1.07*  4.31  -9.60  10.50 
LONG-SHORT EQUITY               
HFR  1.75***  3.07  0.02  1.24**  4.84*  -7.65  10.88 
CSFB/TREMONT  1.50***  3.74  -0.10  2.19*** 15.26***  -11.43  13.01 
TUNA  2.20***  3.07  0.37  1.68*** 10.73***  -6.31  12.50 Discussion Paper 2001-09 




  Mean  Standard
Deviation 





EQUITY MARKET NEUTRAL               
ZURICH  0.99***  0.54  0.10  2.98*** 28.40***  -1.03  2.76 
HENNESSEE  0.71***  0.87  -0.31  0.46  1.92  -1.66  3.00 
HFR  0.91***  1.11  -0.21  0.16  0.67  -2.00  3.60 
CSFB/TREMONT  1.14***  0.90  -0.10  0.39  0.61  -1.15  3.26 
TUNA  1.27***  1.60  -0.19  0.23  0.63  -2.82  5.24 
VAN  1.40***  1.43  0.85***  2.97*** 37.02***  -1.70  6.70 
MARKET INDICES                
S&P 500   1.55***  4.53  -0.87***  1.05*  13.19***  -14.46  9.67 
DJIA  1.51***  4.56  -0.68**  1.15*  10.01***  -15.00  10.38 
Russell 2000  1.14*  5.76  -0.50*  1.34**  8.86**  -19.42  16.42 
NASDAQ  1.80*  8.91  -0.57**  0.75  5.91*  -22.90  21.98 
Lehman Gov. Bond  0.62***  0.86  0.14  0.24  0.44  -1.47  3.02 
 
Notes: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. The Bera-Jarque 
normality test is asymptotically distributed as a central c
2 with 2 degrees of freedom under the null 
hypothesis, with 5% critical value 5.99.  Discussion Paper 2001-09 




Table 2: Correlation between Hedge Fund Index Returns and Market Indices 
 
  S&P500  DJIA  Russell 2000 NASDAQ  Lehman 
AGGREGATE           
HENNESSEE  0.65  0.57  0.87  0.79  -0.05 
CSFB/TREMONT  0.50  0.42  0.63  0.56  0.13 
ALTVEST  0.66  0.55  0.88  0.84  -0.01 
VAN  0.64  0.55  0.87  0.81  -0.05 
HFR  0.70  0.61  0.90  0.84  -0.03 
TUNA  0.67  0.55  0.88  0.85  0.02 
FUNDS OF FUNDS           
ZURICH  0.57  0.51  0.79  0.68  -0.04 
TUNA  0.51  0.42  0.77  0.72  -0.02 
ALTVEST  0.58  0.46  0.88  0.86  -0.06 
VAN  0.49  0.42  0.69  0.67  -0.02 
HFR  0.53  0.47  0.73  0.66  -0.05 
CONVERTIBLE ARBITRAGE           
HENNESSEE  0.36  0.31  0.48  0.53  -0.17 
HFR  0.36  0.34  0.49  0.38  -0.08 
CSFB/TREMONT  0.08  0.09  0.22  0.08  -0.11 
TUNA  0.25  0.21  0.37  0.36  -0.11 
RISK ARBITRAGE           
ZURICH  0.56  0.52  0.69  0.50  -0.06 
HENNESSEE  0.47  0.44  0.67  0.48  -0.14 
TUNA  0.49  0.44  0.51  0.40  0.022 
ALTVEST  0.58  0.56  0.67  0.50  -0.12 
HFR  0.43  0.42  0.58  0.36  -0.11 
DISTRESSED           
ZURICH  0.53  0.53  0.71  0.55  -0.09 
HENNESSEE  0.43  0.42  0.67  0.54  -0.18 
TUNA  0.48  0.45  0.78  0.60  -0.06 
ALTVEST  0.54  0.47  0.72  0.65  -0.10 
VAN  0.39  0.34  0.63  0.54  -0.07 
HFR  0.48  0.48  0.65  0.53  -0.14 
EMERGING MARKETS           
ZURICH  0.55  0.57  0.65  0.55  -0.16 
HENNESSEE  0.55  0.58  0.64  0.57  -0.15 
HFR  0.59  0.60  0.63  0.59  -0.14 
CSFB/TREMONT  0.51  0.53  0.57  0.51  -0.15 
ALTVEST  0.69  0.59  0.81  0.80  -0.01 
VAN  0.56  0.59  0.64  0.59  -0.13 
MACRO           
ZURICH  0.46  0.47  0.54  0.39  0.20 
HENNESSEE  0.51  0.49  0.55  0.39  0.22 
HFR  0.45  0.39  0.60  0.50  0.25 
CSFB/TREMONT  0.28  0.24  0.28  0.19  0.24 
TUNA  0.25  0.24  0.27  0.18  0.28 
ALTVEST  0.60  0.52  0.68  0.67  0.22 
VAN  0.39  0.32  0.54  0.54  0.05 
LONG-SHORT EQUITY           
HFR  0.65  0.51  0.90  0.87  -0.01 
CSFB/TREMONT  0.60  0.47  0.87  0.84  0.04 
TUNA  0.60  0.45  0.90  0.86  -0.03 
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  S&P500  DJIA  Russell 2000 NASDAQ  Lehman 
EQ. MARKET NEUTRAL 
ZURICH  0.23  0.15  0.50  0.34  0.29 
HENNESSEE  0.54  0.46  0.23  0.24  0.28 
HFR  0.52  0.53  0.41  0.37  0.23 
CSFB/TREMONT  0.35  0.31  0.28  0.14  0.01 
TUNA  0.16  0.08  0.57  0.42  0.12 
VAN  -0.02  0.08  0.44  0.44  -0.01 
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Table 3: Intra-Category Correlations between Hedge Fund Indices 
 
AGGREGATE  CSFB/TREMONT  ALTVEST  VAN  HFR  TUNA 
HENNESSEE  0.70  0.88  0.91  0.97  0.83 
CSFB/TREMONT    0.74  0.72  0.71  0.77 
ALTVEST      0.97  0.92  0.97 
VAN        0.93  0.96 
HFR          0.86 
FUNDS OF FUNDS  TUNA  ALTVEST  VAN  HFR 
ZURICH  0.90  0.74  0.77  0.97 
TUNA    0.91  0.90  0.97 
ALTVEST      0.83  0.83 
VAN        0.93 
CONVERTIBLE ARBITRAGE  HFR  CSFB/TREMONT  TUNA 
HENNESSEE  0.58  0.20  0.77 
HFR    0.46  0.72 
CSFB/TREMONT      0.35 
RISK ARBITRAGE  HENNESSEE  TUNA  ALTVEST  HFR 
ZURICH  0.91  0.72  0.94  0.91 
HENNESSEE    0.77  0.93  0.91 
TUNA      0.77  0.76 
ALTVEST        0.89 
DISTRESSED  HENNESSEE  TUNA  ALTVEST  VAN  HFR 
ZURICH  0.91  0.93  0.84  0.52  0.95 
HENNESSEE    0.94  0.87  0.54  0.94 
TUNA      0.90  0.63  0.95 
ALTVEST        0.76  0.88 
VAN          0.64 
EMERGING MARKETS  HENNESSEE  HFR  CSFB/TREMONT  ALTVEST  VAN 
ZURICH  0.96  0.94  0.94  0.67  0.75 
HENNESSEE    0.97  0.95  0.72  0.86 
HFR      0.96  0.73  0.89 
CSFB/TREMONT        0.71  0.82 
ALTVEST          0.71 
MACRO  HENNESSEE  HFR  CSFB/TREMONT  TUNA  ALTVEST  VAN 
ZURICH  0.47  0.46  0.29  0.28  0.37  0.12 
HENNESSEE    0.80  0.66  0.39  0.52  0.35 
HFR      0.73  0.52  0.77  0.55 
CSFB/TREMONT        0.52  0.50  0.35 
TUNA          0.37  0.08 
ALTVEST            0.51 
LONG-SHORT EQUITY  CSFB/TREMONT  TUNA 
HFR  0.94  0.95 
CSFB/TREMONT    0.85 
EQ.  MARKET NEUTRAL  HENNESSEE  HFR  CSFB/TREMONT  TUNA  VAN 
ZURICH  0.39  0.26  0.14  0.12  0.71 
HENNESSEE    0.68  0.27  0.35  0.07 
HFR      0.31  0.29  -0.03 
CSFB/TREMONT        0.47  0.02 
TUNA          0.05 
MARKET INDICES   DJIA  Russell 2000  NASDAQ  Lehman 
S&P 500  0.82  0.58  0.50  0.17 
DJIA    0.63  0.29  0.11 
Russell 2000      0.64  0.03 
NASDAQ        0.03 Discussion Paper 2001-09 







Table 4: Inter-Category Correlations between HFR Indices 
 












AGGREGATE  0.91  0.61  0.57  0.79  0.85  0.71  0.95  0.23 
FUNDS OF FUNDS    0.59  0.45  0.79  0.86  0.80  0.83  0.20 
CONVERTIBLE ARBITRAGE      0.54  0.76  0.53  0.38  0.50  0.17 
RISK ARBITRAGE        0.59  0.46  0.29  0.49  0.26 
DISTRESSED          0.73  0.52  0.68  0.20 
EMERGING MARKETS            0.58  0.70  0.17 
MACRO              0.65  0.24 
LONG-SHORT                0.16 
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                         Table 5: Time Series Properties of Hedge Fund Index Returns  
  
  ACF(1)  ACF(2) ACF(3) ACF(4) ACF(5) LB-Q(10)  ARCH(4) 
AGGREGATE               
HENNESSEE  0.17  -0.02  -0.07  -0.09  -0.13  6.64  1.55 
CSFB/TREMONT  0.05  0.01  -0.04  -0.13  0.06  5.39  1.41 
ALTVEST  0.15  0.01  -0.08  -0.11  -0.12  6.30  2.18 
VAN  0.17  0.05  -0.11  -0.07  -0.11  7.08  4.99 
HFR  0.17  -0.01  -0.08  -0.06  -0.11  6.88  0.31 
TUNA  0.18  0.03  -0.93  -0.10  -0.14  7.64  8.06* 
FUNDS OF FUNDS               
ZURICH  0.21*  0.07  -0.09  -0.15  -0.15  11.01  0.20 
TUNA  0.26**  0.06  -0.08  -0.12  -0.16  11.10  3.88 
ALTVEST  0.20*  0.04  -0.06  -0.07  -0.15  9.60  10.67** 
VAN  0.36***  0.10  -0.13  -0.16  -0.16  17.99**  4.43 
HFR  0.30**  0.08  -0.05  -0.10  -0.11  11.13  6.94 
CONVERTIBLE ARBITRAGE               
HENNESSEE  0.42***  0.04  -0.03  -0.13  -0.12  18.46**  11.69** 
HFR  0.40***  0.11  -0.15  -0.08  -0.13  22.57**  9.86** 
CSFB/TREMONT  0.53***  0.43***  0.03  0.06  -0.04  41.71***  12.89** 
TUNA  0.43***  0.13  -0.08  -0.04  -0.08  21.59**  3.87 
RISK ARBITRAGE               
ZURICH  0.25**  0.02  -0.07  -0.09  0.01  10.81  0.32 
HENNESSEE  0.17  -0.04  -0.05  -0.15  0.05  8.79  0.78 
TUNA  0.16  -0.02  -0.05  -0.01  0.19*  11.11  3.19 
ALTVEST  0.26**  -0.01  -0.06  -0.04  -0.03  10.06  0.83 
HFR  0.17  0.04  0.01  -0.16  0.01  7.42  10.54** 
DISTRESSED               
ZURICH  0.33***  0.16  -0.01  0.03  -0.11  13.16  0.26 
HENNESSEE  0.41***  0.17  0.02  0.05  -0.01  17.94*  0.62 
TUNA  0.24**  0.07  -0.08  -0.08  -0.06  6.95  0.51 
ALTVEST  0.38***  0.08  -0.07  -0.08  -0.08  15.49  0.34 
VAN  0.22**  0.02  -0.03  -0.04  -0.05  5.95  1.11 
HFR  0.43***  0.13  -0.03  0.02  -0.06  17.33*  0.51 
EMERGING MARKETS               
ZURICH  0.23**  0.11  0.06  0.01  0.02  9.66  3.12 
HENNESSEE  0.23**  0.04  0.01  0.01  -0.01  9.74  2.74 
HFR  0.28**  0.04  0.05  0.04  0.02  10.61  1.83 
CSFB/TREMONT  0.25**  0.01  0.05  0.05  0.04  8.42  1.79 
ALTVEST  0.16  -0.02  -0.05  -0.12  -0.02  4.24  0.24 
VAN  0.17  0.06  -0.02  -0.08  0.05  9.35  1.35 
MACRO               
ZURICH  -0.07  -0.01  -0.18  0.02  0.08  5.91  2.22 
HENNESSEE  0.05  -0.05  -0.07  -0.09  -0.01  4.87  5.89 
HFR  0.11  0.01  -0.03  -0.10  0.09  6.77  2.75 
CSFB/TREMONT  0.02  0.05  0.07  -0.14  0.28**  16.17*  2.47 
TUNA  -0.05  -0.25**  -0.08  0.03  0.31***  29.06***  2.07 
ALTVEST  0.07  -0.02  -0.11  -0.06  -0.15  8.44  4.81 
VAN  0.01  -0.04  -0.01  -0.10  0.06  10.09  8.12* 
LONG-SHORT EQUITY               
HFR  0.10  -0.01  -0.04  -0.08  -0.20*  7.03  9.96** 
CSFB/TREMONT  0.10  0.01  -0.10  -0.15  -0.26**  12.83  6.95 
TUNA  0.16  0.04  -0.07  -0.07  -0.19*  8.88  12.29** 
               Discussion Paper 2001-09 




  ACF(1)  ACF(2) ACF(3) ACF(4) ACF(5) LB-Q(10)  ARCH(4) 
EQUITY MARKET NEUTRAL 
ZURICH  -0.01  -0.04  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  7.39  1.26 
HENNESSEE  0.22**  0.20*  0.14  0.01  0.14  28.83***  3.67 
HFR  0.23**  0.01  -0.01  0.04  0.16  21.23**  3.42 
CSFB/TREMONT  0.11  -0.06  -0.13  -0.18  -0.03  15.37  17.34*** 
TUNA  0.13  0.01  -0.10  -0.26**  -0.12  14.89  3.13 
VAN  0.14  -0.01  -0.03  -0.02  -0.05  6.61  9.58** 
MARKET INDICES                
S&P 500   -0.10  -0.06  0.05  -0.05  0.05  4.12  4.64 
DJIA  -0.11  -0.01  -0.12  -0.01  0.11  6.25  5.95 
Russell 2000  0.01  -0.13  -0.15  -0.05  -0.21*  10.34  0.56 
NASDAQ  0.02  -0.02  0.04  0.03  -0.15  4.22  15.44*** 
Lehman Gov. Bond   0.21*  -0.05  0.18  -0.02  -0.05  7.49  7.83 
 
Notes: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. The Ljung-Box 
Q* test for autocorrelation of order up to 10 is asymptotically distributed as a central c
2 with 10 
degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis, with 5% critical value 18.31; ARCH(4) is Engle’s LM 
test for autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity, which is asymptotically distributed as a central c
2 
with 4 degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis, with 5% critical value 9.49. Discussion Paper 2001-09 




 Table 6:  Standard Deviations and Sharpe Ratios for Observed 1-Month, Unsmoothed 1-Month 
and 3-Month Hedge fund Index Returns  
  Observed 











AGGREGATE             
HENNESSEE  2.34  1.02  2.80  0.85  2.66  0.73 
CSFB/TREMONT  2.86  0.94  3.01  0.90  2.79  0.77 
ALTVEST  2.24  1.65  2.62  1.42  2.49  1.10 
VAN  2.53  1.24  3.01  1.04  2.93  0.81 
HFR  2.44  1.12  2.91  0.94  2.77  0.77 
TUNA  2.19  1.80  2.64  1.49  2.43  1.18 
FUNDS OF FUNDS             
ZURICH  1.64  1.20  2.03  0.97  1.91  0.90 
TUNA  1.82  1.30  2.38  1.00  2.07  0.95 
ALTVEST  2.99  1.54  3.76  1.22  3.47  0.93 
VAN  2.40  1.16  3.50  0.80  3.03  0.73 
HFR  2.07  0.70  2.81  0.52  2.47  0.58 
CONVERTIBLE ARBITRAGE             
HENNESSEE  1.07  1.72  1.69  1.09  1.49  1.08 
HFR  0.92  2.64  1.41  1.73  1.22  1.62 
CSFB/TREMONT  1.36  1.81  2.42  1.01  1.87  1.07 
TUNA  0.96  2.90  1.53  1.82  1.31  1.67 
RISK ARBITRAGE             
ZURICH  1.07  2.14  1.39  1.65  1.32  1.46 
HENNESSEE  0.98  2.28  1.17  1.91  1.19  1.58 
TUNA  1.03  2.70  1.20  2.32  1.20  1.85 
ALTVEST  1.12  2.67  1.47  2.04  1.40  1.66 
HFR  1.06  2.26  1.26  1.90  1.19  1.68 
DISTRESSED             
ZURICH  1.77  1.17  2.51  0.83  2.31  0.78 
HENNESSEE  1.88  0.89  2.92  0.58  2.57  0.61 
TUNA  2.46  0.83  3.17  0.65  2.92  0.61 
ALTVEST  1.82  1.32  2.72  0.88  2.47  0.81 
VAN  1.53  1.44  1.92  1.14  1.86  1.00 
HFR  1.75  0.94  2.79  0.59  2.38  0.66 
EMERGING MARKETS             
ZURICH  4.75  0.01  5.97  0.01  5.88  0.10 
HENNESSEE  4.59  -0.07  5.77  -0.05  5.79  0.07 
HFR  5.04  0.11  6.70  0.08  6.34  0.14 
CSFB/TREMONT  5.64  -0.02  7.14  -0.02  7.19  0.08 
ALTVEST  2.21  1.27  2.59  1.08  2.48  0.88 
VAN  6.05  0.12  7.14  0.10  7.15  0.14 
MACRO             
ZURICH  1.61  0.89  1.49  0.96  1.36  1.04 
HENNESSEE  2.55  0.59  2.70  0.56  2.66  0.56 
HFR  2.34  0.98  2.62  0.87  2.25  0.86 
CSFB/TREMONT  4.18  0.83  4.26  0.81  4.12  0.63 
TUNA  2.82  1.06  2.62  1.14  1.91  1.24 
ALTVEST  2.72  1.26  2.93  1.17  2.61  0.97 
VAN  3.48  0.34  3.53  0.33  3.74  0.33 
LONG-SHORT             
HFR  3.07  1.48  3.41  1.33  3.36  0.95 
CSFB/TREMONT  3.74  0.99  4.15  0.89  3.93  0.70 
TUNA  3.07  1.98  3.63  1.68  3.44  1.19 Discussion Paper 2001-09 




  Observed 











EQUITY MARKET NEUTRAL             
ZURICH  0.54  3.53  0.46  3.69  0.55  3.12 
HENNESSEE  0.87  1.07  1.09  0.85  1.10  1.04 
HFR  1.11  1.48  1.41  1.16  1.38  1.08 
CSFB/TREMONT  0.90  2.70  1.00  2.43  0.93  2.13 
TUNA  1.60  1.81  1.82  1.59  1.96  1.19 
VAN  1.43  2.32  1.43  2.33  1.46  1.73 
MARKET INDICES             
S&P 500  4.53  0.85  4.12  0.94  4.54  0.85 
DJIA  4.56  0.81  4.11  0.90  4.35  0.85 
Russell 2000  5.76  0.42  5.85  0.41  5.32  0.45 
NASDAQ  8.91  0.53  9.15  0.52  9.19  0.51 
Lehman Gov. Bond  0.86  0.75  0.87  0.75  0.93  0.72 
  
Note: for comparability with observed and unsmoothed standard deviations, the  
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Table 7: Portfolio Optimization at 8% Standard Deviation: Annualised Improvement in 
Expected Return over No Hedge Fund Case and Percentage of Portfolio Invested in Hedge Funds 
 
  Observed Returns  Unsmoothed returns  3-month returns 
  Mean  % HF  Mean  % HF  Mean  % HF 
AGGREGATE             
HENNESSEE  1.08  64.85  0.20  25.97  0.36  37.44 
CSFB/TREMONT  1.08  49.46  0.54  32.88  0.84  49.82 
ALTVEST  5.28  93.44  3.37  87.75  4.20  93.84 
VAN  2.64  84.43  0.91  46.75  1.44  64.25 
HFR  1.44  77.39  0.36  35.19  0.64  52.08 
TUNA  6.12  100.00  4.01  86.83  5.20  95.71 
FUNDS OF FUNDS             
ZURICH  1.32  67.19  0.41  45.65  0.48  52.32 
TUNA  2.16  69.51  0.78  51.54  1.20  72.20 
ALTVEST  5.16  77.04  2.39  52.02  3.68  69.65 
VAN  2.16  73.69  0.28  22.05  0.80  43.56 
HFR  0.12  21.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
CONVERTIBLE ARBITRAGE             
HENNESSEE  1.92  55.43  0.94  60.69  1.08  61.05 
HFR  0.72  54.24  2.40  55.40  2.52  57.08 
CSFB/TREMONT  3.12  53.05  1.66  58.60  2.56  56.01 
TUNA  3.72  53.24  3.11  55.20  3.20  57.14 
RISK ARBITRAGE             
ZURICH  2.64  58.22  0.00  0.00  2.00  61.68 
HENNESSEE  2.64  56.07  1.74  60.59  2.00  58.71 
TUNA  3.60  56.82  3.18  53.34  3.08  60.15 
ALTVEST  3.96  59.12  3.37  59.68  3.40  63.43 
HFR  2.88  56.31  2.48  53.16  2.32  59.35 
DISTRESSED             
ZURICH  1.56  68.93  0.18  24.96  0.40  40.54 
HENNESSEE  0.60  53.31  0.01  3.79  0.00  6.09 
TUNA  0.60  42.63  0.07  11.22  0.08  16.30 
ALTVEST  2.16  70.45  0.35  32.76  0.60  49.39 
VAN  2.28  60.92  1.49  63.76  1.44  67.24 
HFR  0.60  57.49  0.00  0.00  0.04  9.83 
EMERGING MARKETS             
ZURICH  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
HENNESSEE  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
HFR  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
CSFB/TREMONT  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
ALTVEST  2.40  91.87  0.98  63.23  1.40  74.52 
VAN  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
MACRO             
ZURICH  0.36  56.16  0.67  56.29  0.52  57.30 
HENNESSEE  0.00  3.71  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
HFR  1.20  61.24  0.54  38.56  0.92  59.38 
CSFB/TREMONT  1.20  31.13  0.95  26.80  1.44  34.11 
TUNA  2.28  58.17  2.42  62.60  3.44  62.21 
ALTVEST  2.64  75.86  1.63  58.84  2.76  88.70 
VAN  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
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  Observed Returns  Unsmoothed returns  3-month returns 
  Mean  % HF  Mean  % HF  Mean  % HF 
LONG-SHORT EQUITY 
HFR  4.68  74.65  3.06  64.93  3.84  71.50 
CSFB/TREMONT  1.32  43.96  0.58  26.82  0.76  44.52 
TUNA  8.76  74.80  5.88  62.55  7.36  69.71 
EQUITY MARKET NEUTRAL             
ZURICH  2.28  50.97  2.11  45.31  1.88  50.94 
HENNESSEE  0.12  55.83  0.50  46.25  0.28  50.10 
HFR  1.32  58.11  0.76  57.33  0.68  60.39 
CSFB/TREMONT  3.12  53.99  2.62  51.71  2.60  55.09 
TUNA  3.84  56.37  3.18  58.79  3.16  63.72 
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Table 8: Portfolio Optimization at 8% Standard Deviation: Change in Skewness 
and Kurtosis due to Addition Hedge Funds  
 
  Observed Returns  Unsmoothed returns  3-month returns 
  Skew  Kurt  Skew  Kurt  Skew  Kurt 
AGGREGATE             
HENNESSEE  -0.63  3.95  -0.34  1.25  -0.47  2.02 
CSFB/TREMONT  0.00  0.98  -0.13  0.75  0.02  0.92 
ALTVEST  0.17  1.89  0.48  1.5  0.46  1.66 
VAN  0.44  1.81  -0.14  0.99  0.1  1.31 
HFR  -0.33  2.57  -0.34  1.21  -0.41  1.85 
TUNA  0.58  1.41  0.63  1.03  0.62  1.23 
FUNDS OF FUNDS             
ZURICH  -0.60  3.93  -0.42  2.30  -0.48  2.82 
TUNA  -0.40  2.51  -0.35  1.75  -0.27  2.39 
ALTVEST  1.04  1.33  0.46  0.11  1.08  1.12 
VAN  0.19  1.16  -0.12  0.30  -0.11  0.63 
HFR  -0.26  0.96  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
CONVERTIBLE ARBITRAGE             
HENNESSEE  -0.41  1.82  -0.38  1.83  -0.39  1.88 
HFR  -0.58  2.87  -0.55  2.81  -0.58  3.01 
CSFB/TREMONT  -0.77  4.89  -0.86  6.16  -0.78  5.29 
TUNA  -0.44  2.16  -0.40  2.09  -0.43  2.23 
RISK ARBITRAGE             
ZURICH  -0.88  4.65  0.00  0.00  -0.93  5.16 
HENNESSEE  -0.85  4.30  -0.92  4.92  -0.87  4.61 
TUNA  -0.74  3.65  -0.63  3.11  -0.77  3.95 
ALTVEST  -0.81  4.29  -0.77  4.21  -0.87  4.84 
HFR  -0.98  5.26  -0.83  4.50  -1.03  5.81 
DISTRESSED             
ZURICH  -1.39  8.59  -0.40  1.86  -0.75  3.98 
HENNESSEE  -1.18  5.90  -0.07  0.21  -0.12  0.35 
TUNA  -1.18  6.01  -0.26  0.92  -0.40  1.51 
ALTVEST  -0.92  4.53  -0.44  1.69  -0.68  3.03 
VAN  -0.70  3.02  -0.66  3.02  -0.66  3.24 
HFR  -1.15  5.97  0.00  0.00  -0.17  0.55 
EMERGING MARKETS             
ZURICH  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
HENNESSEE  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
HFR  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
CSFB/TREMONT  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
ALTVEST  -0.23  1.96  -0.31  1.58  -0.28  1.75 
VAN  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
MACRO             
ZURICH  0.11  0.56  0.08  0.50  0.09  0.53 
HENNESSEE  -0.04  0.11  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
HFR  0.21  0.19  -0.02  0.18  0.19  0.14 
CSFB/TREMONT  0.30  -0.04  0.20  -0.05  0.33  -0.08 
TUNA  0.70  -0.27  0.74  -0.49  0.63  -0.63 
ALTVEST  0.79  -0.75  0.55  -0.86  0.96  -0.81 
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  Observed Returns  Unsmoothed returns  3-month returns 
  Skew  Kurt  Skew  Kurt  Skew  Kurt 
LONG-SHORT EQUITY 
HFR  0.66  0.83  0.61  0.46  0.64  -0.42 
CSFB/TREMONT  0.04  1.14  -0.15  0.71  0.11  1.01 
TUNA  1.00  1.35  1.01  0.99  1.02  1.16 
EQUITY MARKET NEUTRAL             
ZURICH  -0.22  0.86  -0.17  0.72  -0.18  0.74 
HENNESSEE  -0.33  1.68  -0.26  1.27  -0.27  1.40 
HFR  -0.11  0.87  -0.07  0.72  -0.06  0.73 
CSFB/TREMONT  -0.13  0.98  -0.09  0.82  -0.08  0.86 
TUNA  -0.17  1.47  -0.11  1.33  -0.08  1.38 
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Table 9: Correlation between Hedge Fund Index Returns and Market Indices for 
Observed 1-Month, Unsmoothed 1-Month and 3-Month Returns 
 


















AGGREGATE             
HENNESSEE  0.65  0.67  0.71  -0.05  0.04  -0.54 
CSFB/TREMONT  0.50  0.52  0.60  0.13  0.22  -0.29 
ALTVEST  0.66  0.68  0.70  -0.01  0.08  -0.46 
VAN  0.64  0.66  0.67  -0.05  0.05  -0.47 
HFR  0.70  0.72  0.75  -0.03  0.05  -0.45 
TUNA  0.67  0.68  0.75  0.02  0.13  -0.43 
FUNDS OF FUNDS             
ZURICH  0.57  0.62  0.60  -0.04  0.07  -0.43 
TUNA  0.51  0.56  0.59  -0.02  0.12  -0.48 
ALTVEST  0.58  0.60  0.73  -0.06  0.03  -0.43 
VAN  0.49  0.56  0.55  -0.02  0.14  -0.38 
HFR  0.53  0.56  0.57  -0.05  0.11  -0.46 
CONVERTIBLE 
ARBITRAGE 
           
HENNESSEE  0.36  0.50  0.43  -0.17  -0.09  -0.31 
HFR  0.36  0.47  0.39  -0.08  0.02  -0.23 
CSFB/TREMONT  0.08  0.27  0.06  -0.11  0.00  -0.17 
TUNA  0.25  0.39  0.34  -0.11  -0.03  -0.25 
RISK ARBITRAGE             
ZURICH  0.56  0.60  0.58  -0.06  -0.02  -0.29 
HENNESSEE  0.47  0.49  0.51  -0.14  -0.12  -0.38 
TUNA  0.49  0.50  0.59  0.022  0.00  -0.21 
ALTVEST  0.58  0.62  0.61  -0.12  -0.08  -0.36 
HFR  0.43  0.45  0.55  -0.11  -0.10  -0.31 
DISTRESSED             
ZURICH  0.53  0.63  0.56  -0.09  -0.01  -0.32 
HENNESSEE  0.43  0.50  0.56  -0.18  -0.05  -0.47 
TUNA  0.48  0.51  0.54  -0.06  0.01  -0.30 
ALTVEST  0.54  0.62  0.64  -0.10  0.04  -0.41 
VAN  0.39  0.44  0.42  -0.07  -0.01  -0.28 
HFR  0.48  0.62  0.54  -0.14  -0.02  -0.41 
EMERGING MARKETS             
ZURICH  0.55  0.63  0.50  -0.16  -0.05  -0.52 
HENNESSEE  0.55  0.63  0.53  -0.15  -0.03  -0.56 
HFR  0.59  0.67  0.54  -0.14  -0.02  -0.52 
CSFB/TREMONT  0.51  0.60  0.43  -0.15  -0.02  -0.55 
ALTVEST  0.69  0.73  0.69  -0.01  0.09  -0.44 
VAN  0.56  0.60  0.48  -0.13  -0.03  -0.50 
MACRO             
ZURICH  0.46  0.46  0.32  0.20  0.25  -0.14 
HENNESSEE  0.51  0.52  0.51  0.22  0.26  -0.18 
HFR  0.45  0.47  0.50  0.25  0.33  -0.12 
CSFB/TREMONT  0.28  0.28  0.19  0.24  0.30  0.07 
TUNA  0.25  0.26  0.24  0.28  0.36  0.27 
ALTVEST  0.60  0.61  0.67  0.22  0.28  -0.33 
VAN  0.39  0.39  0.37  0.05  0.12  -0.51 
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HFR  0.65  0.65  0.76  -0.01  0.05  -0.40 
CSFB/TREMONT  0.60  0.60  0.77  0.04  0.11  -0.35 
TUNA  0.60  0.59  0.75  -0.03  0.05  -0.37 
EQ. MKT.  NEUTRAL             
ZURICH  0.23  0.23  0.24  0.29  0.32  0.04 
HENNESSEE  0.54  0.08  -0.04  0.28  0.28  0.25 
HFR  0.52  0.56  0.47  0.23  0.24  0.12 
CSFB/TREMONT  0.35  0.54  0.44  0.01  0.06  -0.30 
TUNA  0.16  0.36  0.26  0.12  0.18  -0.25 






Figure 1: Unconditional Distribution of HFR Risk Arbitrage Index Returns 
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